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ARTICLE
OVERCOMING ADMINISTRATIVE,
PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY
HURDLES IN PONZI SCHEME LITIGATION
SHARON Z. WEISS & NATALIE B. DAGHBANDAN *

INTRODUCTION
The unfortunate reality that comes with a Ponzi scheme case in
bankruptcy is a mass of deceived unsecured creditors clamoring for their
money back, and few, if any, present assets within the bankruptcy estate
with which to pay them. The sheer size of most Ponzi schemes cases
necessarily presents unique evidentiary, procedural and administrative
challenges to professionals seeking to sort out the failed Ponzi enterprise.
Ponzi scheme cases are riddled with litigation, which generally falls into
four categories: (1) litigation against the Ponzi scheme operator(s), (2)
litigation against parties who enabled the scheme to continue (such as
professionals), (3) litigation to recover assets (such as legitimate
accounts receivable or proceeds from the sale of property), and (4)
avoidance actions against those who received property from the Ponzi
scheme. This fourth category (and sometimes the third) may involve
hundreds of defendants, who may be located throughout the country (or
even the world).
This Article provides strategic suggestions and practical
applications for Ponzi scheme litigation, including filing a procedures
motion, seeking substantive or administrative consolidation, and utilizing
and overcoming evidentiary hurdles.

*
Sharon Z. Weiss is a partner in the Santa Monica office of Bryan Cave LLP, and Natalie
B. Daghbandan is an associate in the Los Angeles office. They are both members of the firm’s
Bankruptcy Restructuring and Creditors’ Right Client Service group. The authors acknowledge and
appreciate the efforts of Golden Gate University School of Law to this Article.
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AVAILABILITY OF PROCEDURE ORDERS

When confronting a Ponzi scheme case in bankruptcy, counsel may
petition the court for an order modifying the time otherwise applicable to
various procedural requirements. This petition will likely appeal to the
reason of those professionals involved, due to the immense volume of
adversary proceedings likely to arise in a Ponzi environment. Ponzi
schemes typically give rise to extensive avoiding power actions. 1 The
premise underlying all avoiding power litigation, namely advancing the
Bankruptcy Code’s goal of equality of distribution among those who lose
money when debtors fail, has a particularly pronounced meaning when
the debtor is (or operates) a Ponzi scheme.
Although all investors and creditors may be victims, the havoc
wrought by a Ponzi scheme often falls disproportionately on some. The
trustee thus has, and is obliged to pursue, significant recovery claims
(e.g., avoidance claims) that if taken to judgment and recovery, could
greatly “balance” the ultimate recoveries out of the Ponzi scheme among
investors (including investor-transferees), inter se. This litigation would,
however, also be expensive, time-consuming and likely frustrating for
investors, other creditors and perhaps even the court.
A.

MODIFYING TIME FOR PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

A motion seeking to modify procedures in bankruptcy (“Procedures
Motion”) is designed to ameliorate the problems identified above, to the
extent possible. The Procedures Motion seeks to streamline the litigation
process by modifying, and in some respects eliminating, the need for
individualized review of every case management issue that arises, such
as extending pleading deadlines, effectuating continuances and making
discovery more efficient.
Section 105(a) of Title 11 of the United States Code (“Bankruptcy
Code”) provides authority for the Procedures Motion. 2 It provides in
pertinent part: “The court may issue any order, process . . . that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 3
Accordingly, a party requests—through a Procedures Motion—
entry of an order modifying certain procedures governing adversary
proceedings, including, inter alia, summons issuance, response dates,
calendaring, status conference hearings, discovery, certain motion

1

See Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 598-99 (5th Cir. 2011); Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family
(In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1991).
2
11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (Westlaw 2012).
3
Id.
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practices and settlement or abandonment of avoidance claims. Due to
the large number of adversary proceedings commenced against
multitudes of defendants in a typical Ponzi scheme in bankruptcy, the
movant will argue that some of the informal and formal local practices
should be modified to ease the paper and logistical burdens on the court
and all parties in interest. The proposed modified procedures suggested
below provide a more systematic and efficient manner of managing the
case load and ensuring that no party in interest will be excluded,
inadvertently or otherwise, from receiving notice of any potentially
dispositive action in the adversary proceedings.
1.

Summons Issuance

In the author’s experience, the Clerk of the Court normally issues a
summons within two days from the filing of a complaint. Once the
summons is issued, the Plaintiff is required to serve it, which places
statutory and local rule time pressures on the Plaintiff. 4 Rule 4(m) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 made applicable by Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rule”) 7004, 6 allows a plaintiff 120
days from the filing of a complaint to serve a summons (which time may
be expanded for good cause). 7 The movant may request that his or her
counsel be permitted to insert in the summonses submitted to the court an
issuance date up to sixty days in the future so the complaints can be
grouped and served in sub-groups. Extending the issuance dates of the
summonses will not only allow the movant’s counsel sufficient time to
prepare for service of the complaints on all the defendants, but it will
also obviate the potential for having the court’s staff issue dozens of alias
summonses.
2.

Early Meeting of Counsel

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) and (f), 8 made applicable
by Bankruptcy Rule 7026, 9 govern initial disclosures and meeting
requirements. Through a Procedures Motion, the movant may request to
be excused from these requirements. In light of the large number of
defendants in the looming adversary proceedings, which may be located

4

See, e.g., Bankr. C.D. Cal. R. 7004-1.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
6
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004.
7
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004.
8
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
9
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7026.
5
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nationwide, it would be extraordinarily burdensome for the movant’s
counsel to contact by telephone, or discuss in person, with each and
every defendant, such matters as exchanging documents, preliminary
discovery schedules, witness lists, and other evidence reasonably
available to each party. At the same time, the actual value of such
burdensome conferences most likely would be nominal at best. Instead,
the movant could suggest that his or her counsel mail a letter to all
defendants (which letter could be included with the summons and
complaint). In the letter, the movant’s counsel could provide a partially
completed draft of the joint status report setting forth the movant’s
responses so that each defendant could have all of the information
required of the movant without unnecessary logistical burdens. The
defendants could be asked to complete their respective portion of the
joint status report without the attendant requirement to communicate by
person or by phone. In addition, the letter could provide each defendant
with a telephone number that defendants (or their counsel) may use to
leave messages to which the movant’s counsel will timely respond. The
movant’s counsel also could invite settlement discussions in the letter
and inform each defendant of the modifications to procedures
contemplated by the Procedures Motion.
3.

Initial and Continued Status Conferences

The Procedures Motion could request that the initial status
conference for each group of defendants be held on the same date, which
would be reflected in the summons, and scheduled at least sixty-five days
after issuance of the summons. Furthermore, the movant could request
that the court permit subsequent status conference dates to be utilized as
a trailing date for continued matters. This continuation would enable the
movant to agree to continuances without imposing on the court in each
case. Stipulations with opposing counsel would also be simplified.
Some adversary proceedings against investor defendants will necessarily
be resolved short of trial; perhaps some will be in a default or settlement
status, and the balance will either be continued or have discovery cut-off
dates set. A trailing continuance date of forty-five days would decrease
the burden of scheduling and of reported calls to the courtroom deputy
clerk for continuance requests.
4.

Responses to Adversary Complaints

The movant may request that the court extend the common thirtyday response time to forty-five days. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule
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9006, 10 the court may enlarge the time for a response. The extended
response date should accommodate the needs of most defendants,
including out-of-state defendants that need to engage local counsel. The
enlargement of time would obviate the need of the movant to enter into
multiple stipulations extending the time with many defendants. In
individual cases where the movant is informed of a reasonable hardship,
he or she may separately agree to additional, reasonable time to respond.
5.

Extensions of Time to Respond to Complaints

Although enlarging the time for responding to the complaints
should minimize the number of defendants requesting extensions of time,
the movant may request that the court grant the parties authority to enter
into informal, written extension agreements to extend time to respond,
provided that no extension of time runs beyond the date one week before
the initial status conference date absent a specific order of the court.
Because reasonable extension requests are commonly granted, the
proposed modification is intended to reduce the number of ministerial
pleadings flowing through the clerk’s office.
6.

Defaults

If a defendant fails to interpose a timely response to the adversary
complaint (and thus has defaulted), the movant may file his or her
Request for Entry of a Default Judgment and request, at the first status
conference, for a prove-up hearing. This way, the Plaintiff can separate
the default actions from the balance of the actions to permit final
judgments to be entered pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7054. 11 Such
proposed modifications will reduce the court’s calendaring time in
processing default cases.
Additionally, they would provide the
defendants a second, formal notice of the adversary proceeding, with an
opportunity to avoid default and file a responsive pleading.
7.

Discovery

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7026(d), 12 as made applicable by
Bankruptcy Rule 7026, 13 provides in pertinent part: “Except . . . when
authorized under these rules by order or agreement of the parties, a party

10

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7054; FED. R. CIV. P. 54.
12
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d).
13
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7026.
11
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may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have
conferred as required by Rule 26(f).” 14 Note that, in the Procedures
Motion, the movant may seek a modification of the meet and confer
deadlines as described above in Part I.A.2.
The movant’s likely intention is to obtain some very basic
information from the defendants through written discovery to establish
his or her prima facie case and to learn, as soon as practical, whether a
defendant has any meaningful defenses or would be unable to pay a
judgment even if one were obtained. In order to save mailing costs and
to expedite the discovery process, the movant may request that he or she
be permitted to serve limited formal written discovery concurrently with
the summonses and adversary complaints, provided, for example, that the
response date will be no earlier than thirty days after the response to the
complaint is due. Because the time to answer will be enlarged,
defendants actually will have more than seventy-five days to respond to
this basic, written discovery. In scheduling deadlines, however, the court
should keep in mind that the defendants are being asked to evaluate the
complaint, obtain counsel, respond to the complaint, prepare a meet and
confer report and respond to discovery, all in a relatively short time line.
B.

MODIFYING PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ABANDONMENT
AND SETTLEMENT

Avoidance claims against hundreds of defendants can easily arise in
a Ponzi scheme bankruptcy. The claims against each defendant
transferee may range from hundreds of dollars to several hundred
thousands or millions of dollars. In addition to the procedural
modifications discussed above, a movant may also request modifications
to certain settlement and/or abandonment procedures ordinarily provided
by applicable rules of practice. The modified procedures may be used to
administer claims and adversary actions and reduce litigation expenses
that are disproportionate to the ultimate possible recovery. They might,
for example, establish guidelines whereby avoidance claims can be
abandoned or compromised through a more efficient process than
ordinarily attends case-by-case settlements.
Authority for such a request lies in Bankruptcy Rule 9019(b) 15 and
Bankruptcy Code section 105 16 on the grounds that (1) applying the
ordinary rules to this portfolio of litigation, and (2) requiring the movant
to file a motion and hold a hearing on the settlement of every avoidance
14

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(b).
16
11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (Westlaw 2012).
15

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss4/9

6

Weiss and Daghbandan: Overcoming Hurdles in Ponzi Scheme Litigation

2012]

Overcoming Hurdles in Ponzi Scheme Litigation

647

claim would be unduly expensive for the bankruptcy estate and for the
transferees while unnecessarily burdening the court’s calendar.
Accordingly, using a proposed settlement formula and procedure would
protect the interests of the bankruptcy estate, the defendant transferees
and other general unsecured creditors. The formula for a proposed
settlement of avoidance claims should take into account: (1) the
estimated cost incurred by the bankruptcy estate if litigation were
pursued, (2) an estimate of the ultimate proposed distribution to all
creditors, including the defendant transferee, and (3) the status of the
defendant transferee’s claim in the bankruptcy case.
First, the Procedures Motion can estimate net recovery to investors
based on (i) the amounts the estate would expect to recover (after
discounting for the costs, uncertainties and other vagaries of litigation) if
the estate pursued all avoidance actions to judgment, and (ii) the
distribution to each investor if all legitimate claims were recognized and
allowed. Then, the Procedures Motion can seek authority to effectuate
“net deals” built roughly on the premise that investor-defendants are
entitled to keep the target return calculated under this formula but no
more, and treating as conceptually irrelevant for these purposes whether
the target return is achieved by pre-petition transfers or post-petition
dividends.
The movant may request an order authorizing, but not requiring, the
movant to abandon or settle fraudulent transfer or preference claims
without further order of the court, so long as the abandonment is
warranted under sound business judgment or if the settlement fits within
certain parameters based on an approximation of the outcome extensive
litigation would have had for the defendants, creditors and other
investors. Furthermore, the Procedures Motion may seek authorization
for the movant to exchange a settlement agreement and mutual releases
with such a defendant transferee, where the settlement meets specified
court-approved criteria. Likewise, the Procedures Motion may seek
authority for the movant to abandon any claim or dismiss any adversary
proceeding upon implementation of the settlement, without further order
of the court, including where the defendant has provided evidence that
the movant believes, with sound business judgment, that costs of
collection of any judgment weighed against the likelihood of recovery
from the defendant will not be cost-effective.
II.

SUBSTANTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSOLIDATION

Similar to requests for procedural modifications, a Ponzi scheme in
bankruptcy also provides a unique opportunity for substantive
consolidation of multiple debtors.
As noted below, substantive
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consolidation is when all of the assets and liabilities of two or more
entities become one entity. It typically occurs when the financial affairs
of the entities are hopelessly entangled or when separate corporate
entities have otherwise been disregarded by those in control of the
debtors. There are many competing interests a court may evaluate in
ordering substantive consolidation, that typically involve an intensive
factual analysis.
Should the court conclude that substantive
consolidation is inappropriate with respect to a certain set of debtors
and/or nondebtors, then a movant may suggest administrative
consolidation in the alternative as a procedural matter to assist in
streamlining litigation, pleadings, hearings, rulings, etc.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION

Although not expressly provided for in the Bankruptcy Code, a
Bankruptcy Court’s power to substantively consolidate estates has been
part of the Court’s general equitable powers since passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 17 Under the Bankruptcy Code, the power
derives from the equitable powers embodied in section 105. 18 The
primary purpose of substantive consolidation “is to ensure the equitable
treatment of all creditors.” 19 This equitable remedy pierces the corporate
veil, eliminates inter-company claims, and pools the assets and liabilities
of once separate entities. 20
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to adopt a uniform standard for
substantive consolidation. However, the circuit courts of appeals have
articulated three somewhat divergent standards for its application. 21 The
first test is a three-part burden-shifting test announced by the District of
Columbia Circuit in In re Auto-Train. 22 Under this test, a prima facie
case for substantive consolidation is proven where a movant establishes
17

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., 30 Stat. 544.
11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (Westlaw 2012); see Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d
750, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Reider v. F.D.I.C. (In re Reider), 31 F.3d 1102, 1105 (11th Cir.
1994)); Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 F.2d
515, 518 n.1 (2d Cir. 1988).
19
In re Bonham, 229 F.3d at 764 (quoting In re Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518).
20
Id. (citations omitted).
21
In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co. 860
F.2d 515; Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Five of the nine circuit courts of appeals that have adopted standards for substantive consolidation
have applied restrictive tests. In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195; In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750;
Fishell v. U.S. Tr. (In re Fishell), 111 F.3d 131, *2-3 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished per curiam
opinion); Woburn Assocs. v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp.), 954 F.2d 1, 32 n.15 (1st Cir. 1992);
In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515. Presumably the remaining circuits apply less
restrictive standards.
22
In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d at 276.
18
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by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there is substantial identity
between the entities to be consolidated, and (2) consolidation is
necessary to avoid some harm or to realize some benefit. 23 Creditors are
then given the opportunity to object to consolidation if they can
demonstrate that they (1) relied on the separate credit of one of the
entities, and (2) will be prejudiced by the consolidation. 24 Nevertheless,
the court may overrule an objection and grant substantive consolidation
if the court determines that the benefits of substantive consolidation
“heavily” outweigh the harm. 25
Additional tests were outlined in Augie/Restivo 26 and Owens
Corning. 27 The Second Circuit in Augie/Restivo created a two-prong test
where substantive consolidation is granted when (1) creditors dealt with
the entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on their separate
identity in extending credit, or (2) the affairs of the debtors are so
entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors. 28 In 2005, the
Third Circuit in Owens Corning relied on the Augie/Restivo test in
creating its own restrictive standard. The court determined that
substantive consolidation is applicable only where (1) pre-petition
creditors disregarded debtors’ corporate separateness so significantly that
they relied on a breakdown of entity borders and treated them as one
entity, or (2) the debtors’ post-petition assets and liabilities are so
scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and will hurt all creditors. 29
Regardless of which standard is applied, the realities of a Ponzi
scheme often will satisfy all three tests. A trustee’s investigation into the
structure and business affairs of a Ponzi scheme will likely uncover
evidence that affairs of debtor and nondebtor entities used to further the
Ponzi scheme are so intertwined that consolidation will benefit all
creditors. Even the disjunctive restrictive test is satisfied where “the time
and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble them [is] so
substantial as to threaten the realization of any net assets for all the
creditors or where no accurate identification and allocation of assets is
possible.” 30
The trustee’s investigation may reveal that the Ponzi scheme entities
have commingled their funds so that it would be essentially
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 F.2d
515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988).
27
In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
28
In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d at 518.
29
In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 211.
30
Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 766 (9th Cir. 2000).
24
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impracticable, if not impossible, to retrace and break out the assets,
activities and liabilities of the different entities as part of the overall
Ponzi scheme as a matter of practice, thus, leaving it highly doubtful that
professionals could unscramble the debtors’ books and records. Even the
possibility that the affairs might be unscrambled may not provide a net
benefit to the estate if (1) the associated expense will more than likely
exceed the assets presently on hand in the estate, or (2) if funds become
available to undertake the task, unscrambling would have little meaning
for creditors in any event. Thus, substantive consolidation may be
proper in a Ponzi scheme in bankruptcy where multiple entities were
used to support the Ponzi enterprise.
Recent examples of substantive consolidation in Ponzi scheme
bankruptcies include West End Financial Advisors LLC 31 and Bernard L.
Madoff (“Madoff”). 32 In the substantive consolidation involving the
Madoff Ponzi scheme, the trustee for Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities LLC (BLMIS) and the trustee of Madoff’s individual chapter 7
bankruptcy, among others, reviewed the BLMIS and Madoff financial
affairs and found “a history of payments and transfers from BLMIS to
Madoff, Madoff’s misuse of BLMIS funds, the intertwining of, and lack
of a practical manner in which to separate, the financial affairs of Madoff
and BLMIS.” 33 Similar reasoning (i.e., a hopeless commingling of assets
among multiple entities in a Ponzi scheme) justified substantive
consolidation in West End Financial Advisors LLC. 34
Nonetheless, prior to requesting substantive consolidation, the
following practical considerations should be considered: (1) the effect of
substantive consolidation on creditors, (2) the value of preserving
transfers between bankruptcy estates for avoidance purposes, and (3)
possible tax ramifications.
B.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSOLIDATION

If the bankruptcy court denies a request to order substantive
consolidation, a party in interest may alternatively petition for
administrative consolidation. Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) 35 specifically
allows a court to enter an order to jointly administer related bankruptcy
31

In re West End Fin. Advisors LLC, No. 11-11152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011), ECF
No. 194 (order directing partial substantive consolidation).
32
Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff), No.
08-01789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009), ECF No. 252 (order granting substantive consolidation).
33
Id. at ¶ I.
34
In re West End Fin. Advisors LLC, No. 11-11152 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2011), ECF No.
179 (supplemental application for order directing substantive consolidation ¶¶ 17 and 18).
35
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b).
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cases. 36 In a Ponzi scheme, multiple debtors may be related either by
way of common ownership and control or by the fact that the entities
were created in one way or another to fund the Ponzi scheme and were
operated in a way that disguised the fraud.
If multiple debtors’ business operations and organizations are
closely related parts of a complex and integrated business structure, joint
administration of the cases could simplify and substantially reduce the
costs of separate administration. For example, joint administration
would obviate the need for multiple notices, applications and orders
being served on the same parties. Additionally, if each creditor has
already filed claims against the particular debtor that allegedly owes it
money, then the rights of the debtors’ respective creditors would not be
adversely affected by joint administration of these cases. Accordingly,
administrative consolidation may be in the best interests of the debtors,
their creditors, equity security holders, limited and general partners, the
bankruptcy court and the United States Trustee if the court deems
substantive consolidation improper.
III. EVIDENTIARY CONCERNS
This section briefly surveys various evidentiary considerations
regarding the use of evidence from one Ponzi litigation forum to other
related proceedings.
A.

ADMISSIONS IN PLEA AGREEMENTS TO PROVE INTENT

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that the existence of a Ponzi
scheme may be established by the Ponzi operator’s admissions in a plea
agreement made in connection with criminal prosecution. 37

36

Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) provides, in relevant part:

If a joint petition or two or more petitions are pending in the same court by or against (1) a
husband and wife, or (2) a partnership and one or more of its general partners, or (3) two or
more general partners, or (4) a debtor and an affiliate, the court may order a joint
administration of the estates. Prior to entering an order the court shall give consideration to
protecting creditors of different estates against potential conflicts of interest. An order
directing joint administration of individual cases of a husband and wife shall, if one spouse
has elected the exemptions under §522(b)(2) of the Code and the other has elected the
exemptions under §522(b)(3), fix a reasonable time within which either may amend the
election so that both shall have elected the same exemptions. The order shall notify the
debtors that unless they elect the same exemptions within the time fixed by the court, they
will be deemed to have elected the exemptions provided by §522(b)(2).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b).
37
Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2008); Santa
Barbara Capital Mgmt. v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 2008).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 9

652

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Furthermore, other courts have held that the existence of a Ponzi scheme
is sufficient to establish actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors
for purposes of proving fraudulent transfer. 38 The Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of Florida relied on this same reasoning in an
adversary proceeding related to the Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, PA
bankruptcy where the trustee used Ponzi operator Scott Rothstein’s plea
agreement to establish intent. 39 This holding was also recently applied in
an adversary proceeding related to the Ponzi scheme orchestrated by
Bernie Madoff. 40 Thus, courts nationwide have adopted the general
principle that admissions made in a Ponzi operator’s plea agreement are
sufficient to establish actual intent to defraud.
B.

HEARSAY PROBLEMS WITH WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY

Nevertheless, any practitioner seeking to use the Ponzi operator’s
admissions in his or her plea agreement to establish intent must be
prepared to address evidentiary issues arising from the nature of the plea
agreement. Technically, the plea agreement and resulting judgment
order are hearsay because they are being used for the truth of the matters
asserted, namely that the Ponzi operator ran the debtor as a Ponzi scheme
and had the actual intent to defraud creditors. 41 Yet, the plea agreement
and judgment order are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
803(22), 42 which allows hearsay evidence of a “‘final judgment, entered
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo
contendre), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain
the judgment . . . .’” 43

38

In re AFI Holding, Inc., 525 F.3d at 704; Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Res. Dev. Int’l, LLC,
487 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2007); Picard v. Estate of Chais (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec.
LLC), 445 B.R. 206, 220 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“It is now well recognized that the existence of a
Ponzi scheme establishes that transfers were made with the intent to hinder, delay and defraud
creditors.”) (citations omitted).
39
Stettin v. Adler (In re Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A.), No. 09-34791-BKC-RBR, 2010
WL 5173796, *5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2010) (citing In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d at 811-12)
(“Criminal plea agreements are admissible to establish the existence of a Ponzi scheme and a
wrongdoer’s fraudulent intent.”).
40
In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 445 B.R. at 220-21 (citing Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp.
v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd.), 397 B.R. 1, 8-14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
41
See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
42
FED. R. EVID. 803(22).
43
Rosen v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 310 B.R. 740, 745 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Scholes v. Lehmann,
56 F.3d 750, 762 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding plea agreement admissible under Rule 803(22) in a
fraudulent transfer suit brought by receiver against various third parties).
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Alternatively, a plea agreement may be admissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 807, 44 the “residual” or “catch-all” exception to the
hearsay rule. This rule provides:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not
excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.

The Ninth Circuit applied this rule in deeming the Ponzi operator’s plea
agreement admissible in In re Slatkin. 45 Likewise, in 2011, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York applied this
reasoning to admit admissions made in Madoff’s plea agreement. 46
C.

COORDINATION WITH GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

In a Ponzi scheme context, the bankruptcy trustee, court-appointed
receiver and a government entity may enter into coordination agreements
to facilitate cooperation among multiple entities where each has a role
related to judicial resolution of the Ponzi scheme. Coordination among
these parties is necessary in the Ponzi context because violations of both
criminal and civil laws have occurred with the additional overlay of
bankruptcy laws. Such agreements generally aim to facilitate collection
and distribution of fraudulently obtained funds to Ponzi scheme victims.
The ultimate goal of coordination is to minimize the potential for
expensive litigation. “In every possible instance, the absence of
coordination among the various parties in these cases will diminish the
recovery of the victims and creditors of this fraud.” 47 Coordination
agreements allow multiple parties to collaborate to resolve creditors’ and
investors’ claims against already limited resources, and reduce the extent

44

FED. R. EVID. 807.
Santa Barbara Capital Mgmt. v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2008).
46
Picard v. Estate of Chais (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 445 B.R. 206, 221
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
47
In re Petters Co., No. 08-45257 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 18, 2010), ECF No. 407 (motion
seeking approval of Petters Coordination Agreement ¶ 37); In re Petters Co., No. 08-45257 (Bankr.
D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2010), ECF No. 453 (order approving Petters Coordination Agreement). Tom
Petters was found guilty in December 2009 of twenty felony counts relating to fraud, money
laundering and conspiracy in connection with originating a $3.65 billion Ponzi scheme.
45
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to which the parties to the agreement must compete against each other to
obtain and distribute the same assets.
A coordination agreement was particularly useful in the Dreier LLP
bankruptcy, which resulted from a Ponzi scheme originated by the law
firm’s sole equity partner, Marc Dreier. 48 In Dreier LLP, chapter 11
trustee Sheila M. Gowan (“Trustee Gowan”) and the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (“USAOSDNY”) successfully negotiated a coordination agreement whereby the
USAO-SDNY and Trustee Gowan agreed to divide the debtor law firm’s
assets between the forfeiture and bankruptcy proceedings. 49 The thrust
of the agreement was to prevent the USAO-SDNY from seeking
forfeiture of funds obtained by Trustee Gowan through avoidance actions
in bankruptcy. Because the USAO-SDNY agreed to forbear from
forfeiting the proceeds of certain avoidance actions, Trustee Gowan was
able to distribute the proceeds of these actions to creditors. 50
CONCLUSION
Ponzi schemes provide unique evidentiary, procedural and
administrative challenges in the bankruptcy context. As more of these
schemes inevitably find their way into bankruptcy, the strategies
discussed in this Article can aid practitioners and courts in navigating
through the minefield of Ponzi schemes in bankruptcy.

48

In re Dreier LLP, No. 08-15051 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010), ECF No. 337 (trustee’s
motion for approval of agreements, Exh. B. Coordination Agreement). Court approval of a revised
coordination agreement was entered on June 9, 2010. In re Dreier LLP, No. 08-15051 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2010), ECF No. 610.
49
Coordination Agreement ¶¶ 2-6, In re Dreier LLP, No. 08-15051 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan.
28, 2010), ECF No. 337. Specifically, the agreement provided that the USAO-SDNY “shall not seek
to forfeit or assert a right with respect to the proceeds of any actions seeking to avoid fraudulent
transfers or preferences brought by the Chapter 11 Trustee against the persons and entities identified
in the attached Schedule 2.” Id. at ¶ 4.
50
In re Dreier LLP, No. 08-15051 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010), ECF No. No. 337
(trustee’s motion for approval of agreements, Exh. B. Coordination Agreement).
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